Even as technology races forward, a
growing number of scientists and observers have voiced serious doubts
that artificial life could or would develop in the ways imagined by
popular science. This is becoming less a matter of technical
feasibility and increasingly a question of fundamental potentiality
-- is it ever conceptually possible, does there exist a domain from
which independent being and personhood could arise from the works of
humankind? Here we pursue a dialectic inquiry, examining the domains
purported or assumed to underlie the possibility of artificial life.
By way of an initial approach, let
us work by analogy, in the time-honored mode of classical thought.
‘Sound’ and ‘rain’ each have their own domains, which, while
they overlap, are never truly confused for each other by humans
considered mature and sane. ‘Rain’ creates certain sounds,
including both its typical or expected sounds and rarer, surprising
sounds which are quickly understood to be rain when the observer has
the freedom to make the simplest of inquiries. ‘Sound’ does not
make rain, but it can appear as rain, offering a similarity that is
suggestive: a voluntary similarity that exists in the realm of
poetics, or an involuntary similarity that exists in the realm of
perceptions, and is, as before, quickly understood through simple
inquiries. In short, it is well-accepted that these two areas of
human experience are interrelated, but distinct, and are
distinguishable, even as we accept the limits of our experience: that
is, that some novel and apparently ambiguous entanglement of these
domains may yet arise and occasion fresh inquiry.
Now to the analogy. ‘Life’ and
‘information’ each have their own domains. Declaring this to be
an analogous situation (to the relation of sound and rain) does not
make it so; it merely frames an occasion for discourse. And it is
apparent from the outset, that these two domains are often
assumed to intersect, at least in many contemporary popular
understandings of science. ‘Life’ is now widely accepted as
operating on a kind of information model, via DNA, and ‘information’
is widely accepted as being the animating cause of the operations of
machines, via code; machines which are then passively accorded a kind
of life, as they participate in our physical experience with
ever-increasing sophistication. It remains now to argue against the
thesis (that life and information share a domain that could spawn
artificial life), establishing at a minimum some ground for
reasonable doubt. We will then briefly consider some of the
alternative paradigms that may more fruitfully define the relation of
‘life’ and ‘information’.